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Abstract
The problem of Authenticated Byzantine Generals (ABG) aims to simulate a virtual reliable
broadcast channel from the General to all the players via a protocol over a real (point-to-point)
network in the presence of faults. We propose a new model to study the self-composition of
ABG protocols. The central dogma of our approach can be phrased as follows: Consider a
player who diligently executes (only) the delegated protocol but the adversary steals some pri-
vate information from him. Should such a player be considered faulty? With respect to ABG
protocols, we argue that the answer has to be no.
In the new model we show that in spite of using unique session identifiers, if n < 2t, there
cannot exist any ABG protocol that composes in parallel even twice. Further, for n ≥ 2t, we
design ABG protocols that compose for any number of parallel executions. Besides investigat-
ing the composition of ABG under a new light, our work also brings out several new insights
into Canetti’s Universal Composability framework. Specifically, we show that there are several
undesirable effects if one deviates from our dogma. This provides further evidence as to why
our dogma is the right framework to study the composition of ABG protocols.
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Unique session identifiers.
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1 Introduction
The goal of an Authenticated Byzantine Generals (ABG) protocol is to simulate a virtual reliable
broadcast channel from the General to all the players via a protocol over a real (point-to-point)
network in the presence of faults. In general, one may wish to simulate a virtual network which
may not only involve some reliable/secure channels but also reliable/secure nodes (like a Trusted
Third Party). Traditionally, the notion of faults in the network is captured via a fictitious entity
called adversary that can choose to actively corrupt up to any t of the n players. A player is said
to be non-faulty if he executes only the delegated protocol code and does no more. In contrast, the
computation performed by the faulty players is chosen by the adversary.
It is well known that protocols which correctly simulate the desired virtual network may not
remain correct when run in presence of same/other protocols [Can01]. For most real life networks
such as the Internet, a protocol is seldom executed in a stand alone setting. Composition of protocols
aims to study the correctness/security of protocols when several protocols are run concurrently.
Over the past few decades security of cryptographic protocols in stand alone settings has been
studied fairly well. Canetti extended these studies to arbitrary unknown environments by intro-
ducing the framework of Universal Composability (UC). Ever since, several researchers have built
on it to prove many exciting results. Besides providing a rigorous and an elegant mathematical
framework for proving security guarantees of protocols that run in arbitrary environments, UC is a
classic notion that has seemingly brought secure function evaluation and multi-party computation
ever close to practice.
1.1 Prior Work
Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP) and Byzantine Agreement (BA) were first introduced by
Pease et al. [LSP82, PSL80]. It is well known that BGP (likewise BA) over a completely con-
nected synchronous network is possible if and only if n > 3t [PSL80, LSP82]. Later on, the
problem was studied in many different settings, giving both possibility (protocols) and impossi-
bility results. Some of the prominent settings are - incomplete networks [Dol81], probabilistic
correctness [Rab83], asynchronous networks [FLP85], partially synchronous networks [DDS87], mo-
bile adversaries [Gar94], non-threshold adversarial model [FM98], mixed adversarial model [GP92,
AFM99], hypergraphs [FM00] to name a few.
Pease et al. [PSL80, LSP82] introduced the problem of authenticated Byzantine Generals (ABG).
Here, the players are augmented with Public Key Infrastructure(PKI) for digital signatures to
authenticate themselves and their messages. Pease et al. proved that in such a model tolerability
against a t-adversary can be amazingly increased to n > t, which is a huge improvement over
n > 3t. Being a reasonably realistic model and because of its high fault tolerance, ABG is an
important and popular variant of BGP and hence, has been faily well studied. Dolev [DS83] proved
that any ABG protocol over a completely connected synchronous network of n nodes tolerating a t
Byzantine adversary will require t+ 1 rounds of communication. Further, he proposed algorithms
that takes O(t + 1) rounds and O(nt) messages. Authenticating every message being sent by a
player can be an expensive. Some works have explored cost cutting by considering alternatives to
authentication and limiting the use of signatures. Specifically, Borcherding [Bor95, Bor96b] explored
the possibility of using signatures in only some rounds and not all. An alternative line of thought
was suggested by Srikanth and Toueg [ST87] wherein authenticated messages are simulated by
non-authenticated sub-protocols. In another work, Borcherding [Bor96a] studied different levels
and styles of authentication and its effects on the agreement protocols. This work focuses on
understanding the properties of authentication scheme their impact on building faster algorithms
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for BGP. Gong et al. [GLR95] study the assumptions needed for the authentication mechanism in
protocols for BGP that use signed messages. They propose protocols for BA that add authentication
to oral message protocols so as to obtain additional resilience due to authentication. Schmid and
Weiss [SW04] study ABG under hybrid filure model of node and communication failures. Katz
et al. [KK09] propose expected constant round ABG protocols in the case n > 2t. Gupta et
al. [GGBS10] study ABG in a model where in the adversary can corrupt some players actively and
some more players passively. Further, they require the passively corrupt player to be consistent
with the honest players. They show that their model unifies the results of n > 3t (BPG) and
n > t (ABG). [GKKY10] too explores ABG in a partially compromised signature setting. Bansal
et al. [BGG+11] extend the studies of [GGBS10] to the case arbitrarily connected (undirected)
networks.
Security of protocols under composition was first investigated in [Ore87, MR91, GO94, GK96].
Owing to its impact on the modular approach of constructing cryptographic protocols, compo-
sition of protocols has been well studied in literature. Goldreich and Krawczyk [GK96] studied
sequential and parallel composition zero-knowledge protocols. They proved that zero-knowledge
and strong formulation of zero-knowledge (e.g. black box simulation) are not closed under parallel
execution. Richardson and Kilian [RK99] examined the concurrent composition of zero-knowledge
proofs. Canetti et al. [CKPR01] proved that Black-box concurrent zero-knowledge requires ω(log n)
rounds. Dwork et al. [DNS04] show that under the assumption of a restricted adversary (they call
it (α,β) constraint) there exists perfect concurrent zero-knowledge arguments for every language in
class NP . Canetti [Can00] proposed generic definitions of security for multi-party cryptographic
protocols and proved that the security under these definitions continue to hold under the natural
composition operation [MR91]. Canetti [Can01] introduced UC to study the security/correctness of
protocols when run with arbitrary unknown protocols. [CF01, CK02] study commitments and key
exchanges under composition. Canetti et al. [CLOS02] show that any two-party and multi-party
functionality is closed under universal composition, irrespective of the number of corrupted players.
Canetti and Rabin [CR03] initiated the study of universal composition with joint state. Ben-Or et
al. [BOHL+05] took up the study of universal composability in quantum key distribution. Some of
the recent papers on protocol composition are [Lin03, PS04, HUMQ09, CKS11, CH11, RO12].
Lindell et al. [LLR02] studied the properties of self composition of ABG. They proved that, over
a completely connected synchronous network of n players in presence of a t-adversary, if n ≤ 3t,
then there does not exist any ABG protocol that self-composes in parallel even twice. Further, for
n > 3t, they designed ABG protocols that self-compose in parallel for any number of executions.
Thus, proving the bound of n > 3t to be tight. In the same work, they also show that if one
assumes additional facility of unique session identifiers, fault tolerance for ABG under parallel
self-composition can be restored back to n > t.
The work closest (yet, incomparable) to our line of thought is the model considered by Canetti
and Ostrovsky [CO99]. They use a slightly different perspective as to what a fault “means”. In
particular, they operate under a model where in all the parties (even uncorrupted ones) may deviate
from the protocol but under the sole restriction that most parties do not risk being detected by
other parties as deviating from the protocol.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we present our case as to why the study of self
composition of ABG protocols needs a new approach. This renders the model used in the extant
literature (to study the protocol composition) inappropriate for, at least, a few problems such as
ABG and necessitates the formulation of a better model. In Section 3, we propose a new model to
study protocol composition. We prove our results in Section 4.
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2 The Central Dogma
Consider a player who is concurrently executing several protocols which run as processes. Clearly,
the player is faulty if any one of these processes deviates from the originally designated protocol
code. However, there can be faulty players wherein some of the processes continue to diligently
execute the delegated protocol code. Should such processes be deemed faulty? The answer can be
no since they diligently execute the delegated protocol, hence, they are certainly not Byzantine
faulty. On the other hand, the answer can be yes because the player is faulty and therefore, the
data private to such processes can always be accessed by the adversary1.
All of literature on composition of protocols and in particular, the most recent one on ABG
[LLR02] has considered such processes to be Byzantine faulty. However, in Section 2.1 and 2.2 we
argue as to why it is better to model such processes as passively corrupt (similar to honest but
curious parties).
2.1 To Make Them Faulty or Not ?
The extant literature on (unauthenticated) reliable broadcast requires all non-faulty players to
agree on the same value [PSL80, LSP82]. Consequently, a player can be non-faulty in the following
two ways – (i) The adversary is absent and (therefore) the player follows the delegated protocol.
(ii) The adversary is present, but allows the player to diligently follow the delegated protocol and
therefore, by the virtue of diligently following the protocol the player is non-faulty.
With respect to ABG, the answer does not reveal itself automatically. The issue with ABG is
more subtle because ABG is spawned by interests across various disciplines. In particular, ABG has
continuously drawn inspiration from cryptography and in particular secure multi-party computation
(SMPC). So, in the case of ABG, any attempt to settle the question must consider the cryptographic
viewpoint. When it comes to defining faults in SMPC, recall that, Ber-Or et al. [BGW88] define
a player as faulty if and only if the player deviates from the designated protocol. Therefore, w.r.t
ABG, we have a choice – (i) To punish the player by labelling him as faulty, if the adversary steals
any private information (such as digital signature) from the player, despite the player diligently
executing the designated protocol. (ii) To reward the player for diligently following the protocol and
pay him back for his efforts by not labelling him as faulty (remember, that this player has certainly
helped in the simulation of broadcast channel by routing several crucial messages). In continuation,
it is natural to brand all processes, whose private information is stolen by the adversary during
a cryptographic protocol, as faulty. However, we believe w.r.t. ABG, the answer has to be the
other way around. One may argue that reliable broadcast is essentially a primitive in distributed
computing and that authentication was introduced only as a tool. Rather, authentication was only
a means to facilitate the end (reliable broadcast). This is, however, hardly any reason. To find the
answer, one must journey to the very heart of every protocol for Byzantine Generals (BG).
The purpose of any BG (likewise ABG) protocol is to simulate a (virtual) reliable broadcast
channel over a point-to-point network. Consider a scenario wherein the General is connected to
all the players via an an actual physical broadcast channel. All the players including those under
the adversary’s control will always receive the same message from the General. The adversary
can make the players under his influence to discard this message and deviate from the protocol.
However, if the adversary chooses not to do so for any of the player(s) under his control, then such
a player(s) will be in agreement with the group of players who were honest. Therefore, any ABG
1Any process with administrative privileges can always read the data internal to any other process within the
same system.
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(BG) protocol aiming to truly simulate a broadcast channel must ensure consistency between all the
players who follow the designated protocol.
We now elaborate the implications of our dogma on the composition of ABG protocols. It is
well known that in the stand alone execution model, a t-adversary is free to corrupt up to any t
players. With respect to parallel composition of protocols, a t-adversary is free to choose any set
of ≤ t players and corrupt them in all or only some of the executions. This permits the adversary
to corrupt different players in different executions i.e. a t-adversary may as well corrupt, say t1
players (t1 < t) in some of the parallel execution(s) and a different set of t2 players (t2 < t) in
the remaining execution(s). As long as t1 + t2 ≤ t, w.r.t composition, such an adversary is a valid
t-adversary.
The above leads to an interesting observation w.r.t composition of ABG protocols – by Byzantine
corrupting a player in some and not all parallel executions, the adversary can forge messages on
behalf this player even in those executions wherein this player is uncorrupted. We facilitate the
same with the help of the following simple scenario: Consider a player P running two parallel
executions, say E1 and E2, of some (correct) ABG protocol (Figure 1). Further, P uses distinct
authentication keys, say k1 and k2 in the executions E1 and E2 respectively. The adversary corrupts
P in Byzantine fashion only in E1. Consequently, the adversary can forge messages on behalf of P
in E2 even though P is non-faulty in E2. This is because in E1 the adversary can delegate that code
E1 2E
Figure 1: P running processes E1 and E2.
Data
Pull 
E1
E2
Figure 2: By corrupting P in E1, adversary can
always read the complete data of P in E2.
to P which can read the key k2 (or for that matter any private data) from the process E2 (Figure 2).
The above observation can be extended to any number parallel executions E1, E2, . . . , Ek. It is easy
to see that the above observation holds good even if P uses a distinct authentication key in each
of the parallel executions E1, E2, . . . , Ek.
2.2 New insights into current model
Besides providing a new model for composing ABG protocols, our work also draws attention to a few
(not so serious, yet interesting) grey areas in the existing popular models of protocol composition.
These issues deserve to be discussed in greater detail and we deem that these aspects must be
studied in depth before one can unleash the paradigm of composability into the real world. The
following can also be viewed as the ill-effects of modelling the non-faulty processes within a faulty
player as Byzantine faulty:
1. Proving incorrect protocols as correct: A very popular paradigm used in the literature to cap-
ture the security/correctness requirements of a cryptographic protocol is the ideal-world/real-
world simulation paradigm [Can01]. Informally, in this paradigm, a protocol is said to be
correct if for every real world adversary A there exists an ideal world adversary S that can
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match the views of the players and the adversary in the two worlds. We now show that if the
non-faulty processes within a faulty player are treated as Byzantine faulty, then, using the
ideal-world/real-world simulation paradigm, the protocols which are incorrect in the stand
alone settings can be proven to be correct under composition!
Example: Consider the problem of secure addition – players {Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd} start with input
values {va, vb, vc, vd} respectively and wish to find the sum of their combined input values
without revealing their input value to any other player. Consider a protocol ξ which gives
a random value as the answer. Clearly, in a stand alone setting ξ is an incorrect protocol.
However, one can prove ξ to be a correct protocol under composition as follows: Let E1 and
E2 be two concurrent executions of ξ. The real world adversary A corrupts player Pa actively
only in E1. In E2, Pa executes the code exactly as per the specifications of ξ. If Pa is treated
as Byzantine faulty in E2, then in the ideal world execution the ideal world adversary S can
actively corrupt Pa in E2 as well. Thus, in the ideal world execution of E2, S sends that
input value to the TTP(Trusted Third Party) which ensures that the view of the players and
the adversary in the ideal world and real world is same. Specifically, if in E2, the protocol ξ
gives the answer as va + vb + vc + vd + r where is r is some positive random number. Then,
in the corresponding ideal world execution, S on behalf of Pa sends va + r as the input value
to the TTP. This will ensure that the views in the two worlds are same.
2. Basing security on internal communication: Let Λ be a secure composable protocol for some
problem ζ. From Λ one can always construct a new protocol Λ′ as follows: Λ′ is exactly
same as Λ except for the following two changes – (i) Every process in Λ′ sends all it’s data
(including its private data) to all the concurrent processes within the same player. (ii) Every
process in Λ′ ignores this incoming data from any of the fellow concurrent process within the
same player. Clearly, if Λ′ is secure then so is Λ. However, is Λ′ secure given Λ is secure?
The answer can be no if, in Λ′, the faulty processes chose not to ignore the incoming data.
This implies that the security definition is dependent on the internal communication between
the processes within a player. Clearly, one will prefer to have a security definition which does
not depend on such intricate details. As highlighted by Canetti [Can00], this preference stems
from the need and benefits of a simple, intuitive and workable security definition.
In essence, our dogma is the following: All non-faulty processes, i.e. the processes within a
non-faulty player that execute the delegated protocol diligently and do no more, are considered
honest . All Byzantine faulty processes in a Byzantine faulty player are considered corrupt . All
non-faulty processes within a Byzantine faulty player are considered passively corrupt. We aim to
study self composition of ABG protocols in this new paradigm.
3 Model
We are now ready to present our model. Our model is same as the one used in the extant liter-
ature [Can01, LLR02] except for the following (small but important) changes – (i) All non-faulty
processes within a non-faulty player are considered as honest . (ii) All Byzantine faulty processes
within a Byzantine faulty player are considered as corrupt . (iii) All non-faulty processes within a
Byzantine faulty player are treated as passively corrupt. ((iii) follows from the observations made
in Section 2). Here, a process is said to be non-faulty if it exactly executes the delegated protocol
code and does no more. Further, a process is said to be Byzantine faulty if it executes the program
code of adversary’s choice.
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We consider a set of n players, P={p1, p2, . . . , pn}, over a completely connected synchronous
network. Any protocol in this setting is executed in a sequence of rounds where in each round,
a player can perform some local computation, send new messages to all the players, receive mes-
sages sent to him by other players in the same round, (and if necessary perform some more local
computation), in that order. The notion of faults in the system is captured by a virtual entity
called adversary. During the execution, the (polynomial-time) adversary2 may take control of up
to any t players and make them behave in any arbitrary fashion. Such an adversary is called as a
t-adversary. Further, the players can invoke multiple parallel executions of any protocol. We model
this via players running multiple processes in parallel. We assume that the communication channel
between any two players is perfectly reliable and authenticated. We also assume existence of a
(signature/authentication) scheme via which players authenticate themselves. This is modelled by
all the players having an additional setup-tape that is generated during the preprocessing phase.
Note that keys cannot be generated with in the system itself. Similar to [LLR02], it is assumed
that the keys are generated using a trusted system and distributed to players prior to running of the
protocol. Typically, in such a preprocessing phase, signatures and verification keys are generated.
That is, each player gets his own private signature key, and in addition, public verification keys
for all the other players. No player can forge any other player’s signature and the receiver can
uniquely identify the sender of the message using the signature. However, the adversary can forge
the signature of all the t players under its control. The adversary can inject forged messages, on
behalf passively corrupt processes, via Byzantine corrupt processes. Further, we assume that each
run of a protocol is augmented with unique session identifiers (USIDs).
3.1 Defining Composable ABG
We use the well established ideal/real process simulation paradigm to define the requirements of
ABG. Both the ideal process and the real process have the set P of n players including the General
G as common participants. Apart from these, the ideal process has a TTP (Trusted Third Party)
and an ideal process adversary S whereas the real process has a real process adversary A. We start
by defining the ideal process for ABG.
Ideal process (Ψideal): (1) G sends his value v to TTP. (2) TTP forwards the same to all the n
players and S. (3) All honest players output v. S determines the output of faulty players.
We assume that all message transmissions in the above protocol are perfectly secure.
Let IDEALTTP,S(v, rS ,−→r ) denote a vector of outputs of all n players running Ψideal where G
has input v, S has random coins rS and −→r where −→r = r1, r2, . . . , rn, rTTP ; r1, r2, . . . , rn and rTTP
are the random coins of n players and the TTP respectively. IDEALTTP,S(v) denotes the ran-
dom variable describing IDEALTTP,S(v, rS ,−→r ) when rS and −→r are chosen uniformly at random.
IDEALTTP,S denotes the ensemble {IDEALTTP,S(v)}v∈{0,1}.
Real life process (Ψreal(Π)): Unlike in the ideal process, here the players interact among them-
selves as per a designated protocol Π and the real process adversary A. Specifically: (1) Every
honest player proceeds according to the protocol code delegated to him as per Π. (2) The adversary
A may send some arbitrary messages (perhaps posing as any of the corrupt players) to some/all
2Digital signatures based authentication necessitates the assumption of a polynomial-time adversary. Our im-
possibility proofs do not need this assumption but our protocols require a “magical” means to authenticate if the
adversary is unbounded.
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of the players. (3) Honest players output a value as per Π. A determines the output of faulty players.
Let REALΠ,A(v, rA,−→r ) denote a vector of output of all n players running Ψreal(Π) where G has
input v, and rA,−→r = r1, r2, . . . , rn are the random coins of the adversary and n players respectively.
Let REALΠ,A(v) denote the random variable describing REALΠ,A(v, rA,−→r ) when rA and −→r are
chosen uniformly at random. Let REALΠ,A denote the ensemble {REALΠ,A(v)}v∈{0,1}.
We directly adopt the definitions of Lindell et al.[LLR02].
Definition 1 (ABG) Π is an ABG protocol tolerating a t-adversary if for any subset I ⊂ P of
cardinality up to t (that is , |I| ≤ t), it holds that for every probabilistic polynomial-time real process
adversary A that corrupts the players in I in Ψreal(Π), there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time ideal process adversary S in Ψideal that corrupts the players in I, such that the ensembles
IDEALTTP,S and REALΠ,A are computationally indistinguishable.
Definition 2 (Composable ABG [LLR02]) Let Π be an ABG protocol. Π is said to remain
secure under parallel composition if for every polynomial time adversary A, the requirements for
ABG (which is elaborated in Definition 1) hold for Π for every execution within the following
process: Repeat the following process in parallel until the adversary halts:
1. The adversary A chooses the input v for the General G.
2. All players are invoked for an execution of Π (using the strings generated in the preprocessing
phase and an unique session identifier for this execution). All the messages sent by the
corrupted players are determined by the adversary A, whereas all other players follow the
instructions of Π.
Furthermore, as noted by Lindell et al., Definition 2 implies stateless composition i.e. all honest
players are oblivious to the other executions taking place in parallel. In contrast, the adversary A
can coordinate between the parallel executions, and the adversary’s view at any given time includes
all the messages received in all the executions.
3.2 Our Results
Recall that in the absence of unique session identifiers, ABG is not self-composable even twice if
n ≤ 3t [LLR02]. We prove that unique session identifiers aid in improving the fault-tolerance of
ABG protocols (that compose in parallel) but from n > 3t only to n ≥ 2t. We, now, present the
main theorem of this paper:
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem) ABG over n players, tolerating a t-adversary, can be self-composed
in parallel for any number of executions if and only if n ≥ 2t.
To put things in perspective, one can achieve the bound of n > t for (a simplified variant of)
ABG [LLR02] if one makes the following assumption: Only those non-faulty processes that run in
non-faulty players need to be consistent, others need not, where a process is faulty if it deviates
from the designated protocol.
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4 Complete Characterization
The aim of this section is to prove aforementioned Theorem 1. We begin with a few definitions:
Definition 3 (Adversary Structure) An adversary structure Z for the player set P is a collec-
tion of plausible sets of players which can be corrupted by the adversary. Formally, Z ⊆ 2P, where
all subsets of Z are in Z if Z ∈ Z.
Definition 4 (Adversary Basis) For an adversary structure Z, Z¯ denotes the basis of the struc-
ture, i.e. the set of the maximal sets in Z: Z¯ = {Z ∈ Z¯ : ∄Z ′ ∈ Z¯ : Z ⊂ Z ′}
4.1 Qualifiers
We first prove that there does not exist any ABG protocol that self-composes in parallel even twice
over a network of 3 players, P={A,B,C}, tolerating an adversary basis A¯ = {((C), (A)); ((A), (∅));
((B), (A))}. Here, ((x),(y)) represents a single element of the adversary basis such that the adver-
sary can Byzantine corrupt x and y in the first and second parallel execution, respectively. For the
rest of this paper Πk (likewise ∆k) denotes an ABG protocol Π (∆) that remains correct upto k
parallel self-compositions.
Before presenting the proof, we make a few comments on the proof style. As was with Lindell et
al. (the base case of their work draws inspiration from [FLM85]), we establish ours on [GGBS10].
We, however, note that the overlap ends there. We remark that this is not a serious concern and
if at all everything but a testimony to the impact of [FLM85].
Theorem 2 There does not exist any Π2 over a network of 3 nodes, P={A,B,C}, tolerating an
adversary basis A¯ = {((C), (A)); ((A), (∅)); ((B), (A))}.
Proof: Our proof demonstrates that the real process adversary (characterized by A¯) can make the
non-faulty processes in one of the parallel executions of any ABG protocol to have an inconsis-
tent output. In contrast, in the corresponding ideal world execution the non-faulty processes are
guaranteed to have a consistent output. It then follows that there does not exist any ideal world
adversary S that can ensure that the output distributions are similar. This violates Definition 2,
hence the theorem.
C
BA
Figure 3: Network N .
To prove that A¯ can ensure that the non-faulty processes in
one of the parallel executions do not have a consistent output, we
assume otherwise and arrive at a contradiction. We accomplish the
same using the ideas from the proof technique developed by Fischer
et al. [FLM85].
Formally, assume for contradiction that there exists a protocol
Π2 over N (Figure 3), P={A,B,C}, tolerating the adversary basis
A¯ = {((C), (A)); ((A), (∅)); ((B), (A))}. Using Π2, we create a pro-
tocol Π′ [Definition 5] in such a way that existence of Π2 implies
existence of Π′ (Proposition 5.1). We, then, combine two copies of Π′ to construct a system L
(Figure 4) and show that L must exhibit contradictory behaviour. It then follows that the assumed
protocol Π2 cannot exist.
We do not know what system L solves. Formally, L is a synchronous system with a well defined
behaviour. That is, for any particular input assignment L exhibits some well defined output
distribution. We obtain a contradiction by showing that for a particular input assignment, no
such well defined behaviour is possible. No player in L is aware of the complete system, rather
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Figure 4: Construction of L using two copies of Π′.
each player is aware of only his immediate neighbours. In reality, a player may be connected to
either A or A′ 3, but he cannot distinguish between the two. He knows his neighbours only by
their local name, in this case, A. Further, all players in L are oblivious to the fact that there are
duplicate copies of the nodes in L. Specifically, for all X ∈ {A,B,C}, L is constructed in a manner
such that the in-neighbourhood of any node X(or X ′) in L is same as the in-neighbourhood of the
corresponding node X in N .
Let the players in L start with input values as indicated in Figure 4; and α be the resulting
execution. All the players in α are honest and diligently follow Π′. Further, let E1 and E2 be two
parallel executions of Π2 over N . We, now, define three distinct scenarios – α1, α2 and α3 :
• α1: In E1, A is the General and starts with input value 0. A¯ Byzantine corrupts C in E1.
In E2 A¯ Byzantine corrupts A.
• α2: In E1, A is the General. Further, in E1, A¯ corrupts A, interacts with B as if A started
with input value 0 and interacts with C as if A started with input value 1.
• α3: In E1, A is the General and starts with input value 1. A¯ Byzantine corrupts B in E1.
In E2 A¯ Byzantine corrupts A.
We claim that, in execution α, both A and B decide on 0. Similarly, we claim that both C and
A′ in α decide on 1. Further, we claim that in α both B and C must decide on the same output
(Figure 5). [To avoid clutter we defer the proof of these claims to Lemma 4, 6 and 8.] However, in
α, players B and C have already decided on 0 and 1, respectively. Hence, L exhibits a contradictory
behaviour.
To complete the above proof, we now define the protocol Π′ [Definition 5] and show that
existence of Π2 implies existence of Π
′ (Proposition 5.1). We then prove the left out claims via
Lemma 3 - Lemma 8.
Definition 5 (Π′) For player B, every statement in Π2 of the kind “B sends message m to A”
is replaced by “B multicasts message m to all instances of A”(i.e. A, A′) in Π′. Similarly, every
3A and A′ are independent copies of A with the same authentication key.
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Figure 5: Player’s output in execution α. Contradiction is shown via red rectangle
statement of the kind “C sends message m to A” in Π2 is replaced by “C multicasts message m to
all instances of A”(i.e. A, A′) in Π′. Rest all statements in Π′ are exactly same as those in Π2.
Proposition 5.1 If Π2 exists, then so does Π
′.
Proof : Follows directly from Definition 5. Given Π2, one can always construct Π
′ by making ap-
propriate changes in Π2 as per the definition of Π
′.
Rest of this section focuses on proving Lemma 3 - Lemma 8. The proofs are conceptually simple
however, owing to the “topology” of system L and presence of authenticated messages, some of
the proofs (Lemma 3, 5 and 7) have tedious details. A reader interested in the proof of our main
theorem can directly jump to Section 4.2.
We begin by introducing the terminology used in the proofs. Let msgΩi (x, y)x denote the
message sent by player x to player y in round i of execution Ω. The x in the subscript refers
to the last player who authenticated this message. W.l.o.g, we assume that every player always
authenticates every message sent by him. Further, let V Ωx,i denote view of player x at the end
of round i in execution Ω. Intuitively, V Ωx,i consists of everything that player x ever “sees” from
round 1 until the end of round i in execution Ω. For our setting this includes (w.r.t execution
Ω) – (i) Input value (if any) of x : IΩx . (ii) Secret key used by x for authentication : SK
Ω
x . (iii)
Protocol code executed by x : θΩx . (iv) Set of all the messages sent by x until the end of round i
: ∀z ∈ P, ∀k ∈ (1, i),
⋃
k(msg
Ω
k (x, z)x). (v) Set of all the messages received by x until the end of
round i : ∀z ∈ P, ∀k ∈ (1, i),
⋃
k(msg
Ω
k (z, x)z). Formally:
V Ωx,i =
[
IΩx , SK
Ω
x , θ
Ω
x ,
⋃
k
(msgΩk (x, z)x),
⋃
k
(msgΩk (z, x)z)
]
; ∀z ∈ P, ∀k ∈ (1, i) (1)
Since the messages sent by player x in round i of Ω is a function of x’s view until the end of round
i− 1 (i.e. V Ωx,i−1), Equation 1 can be rewritten as:
V Ωx,i =
[
IΩx , SK
Ω
x , θ
Ω
x ,
⋃
k
(msgΩk (z, x)z)
]
; ∀z ∈ P, ∀k ∈ (1, i) (2)
Our proofs will often have statements of the following form – view of player x until round i of
execution γ is same as the view of player y until round i of execution δ (dubbed as V γx,i ∼ V
δ
y,i). In
order to prove such statements we will use the following observation:-
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V
γ
x,i ∼ V
δ
y,i if and only in the following conditions
4 hold:
(i) Iγx = Iδy
(ii) SKγx = SK
δ
y
(iii) θγx = θδy
5
(iv) ∀z ∈ P,∀k ∈ (1, i), msgγk (z, x)z = msg
δ
k(z, y)z
Through out our proofs conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) will be trivially satisfied. Thus, our proofs will
focus on proving condition (iv). For brevity we say:
V
γ
x,i ∼ V
δ
y,i iff ∀z ∈ P, ∀k ∈ (1, i), msg
γ
k (z, x)z = msg
δ
k(z, y)z (3)
Let V γx denote view of x at the end of execution γ. Then,
V γx ∼ V
δ
y iff ∀k > 0, V
γ
x,k ∼ V
δ
y,k (4)
Combining (3) and (4), we get
V γx ∼ V
δ
y iff ∀z ∈ P, ∀k > 0, msg
γ
k (z, x)z = msg
δ
k(z, y)z (5)
Though conceptually simple, proving the right hand side of Equation 5 can be a tedious task.
This is because the use of authentication limits the adversary’s ability to send forged messages.
Hence, one must formally establish that the adversary can indeed ensure that the right hand side of
Equation 5 holds true. To facilitate the same, we introduce the notion of execution trees. To under-
stand the utility of execution trees, let us revisit the scenarios α and α1 as defined in the proof of
Theorem 2. Recall that the proof requires us to show that ∀z ∈ {A,B,C}, ∀k > 0, msgαk (z,A)z =
msgE1:α1k (z,A)z . Note that what A receives in round i of α (likewise E1 : α1) depends on what B
and C send him in round i of α (likewise E1 : α1). So, we need to argue that these messages, sent
in round i of α and E1 : α1 respectively, are either same or can be made same by the adversary.
The messages sent by B and C in round i of α (likewise E1 : α1) depend on what they themselves
receive in round i − 1. This in turn depends on what A and C (likewise, A and B) send to B
(C) in round i − 2 of α (E1 : α1). Thus, we need to argue that the adversary can ensure that
whatever messages A,C (likewise, A and B) send to B (C) in round i− 2 of α is same as whatever
messages A,C (A and B) send to B (C) in round i − 2 of E1 : α1. Note that this continues in
a recursive manner until the recursion stops at round 1. The entire recursion can be visualized
as trees, TαA and T
E1:α1
A , rooted at A for executions α and E1 : α1 respectively, as shown in Figure 6.
An execution tree can be regarded as a “visual” analogue of Equation 5. Formally, TΩX is n-ary
tree i.e. a node can have upto n children. where n is the number of players (P) participating in
execution Ω. Each node has a label l ∈ P. The root node of TΩX has label X. The levels of the tree
are named in a bottom up manner. The lower most level is 1, the one immediately above it is 2
and so on. A node x is a child of node y if and only if x is in the in-neighbourhood of y in execution
Ω. Thus the number of children of any node z is same as the size of the in-neighbourhood of z. An
edge from node y at level j to node x at level j +1 in the tree represents the message that y sends
to x in round j of Ω. All the edges in the tree are directed from child to parent and are between
adjacent levels only. Let TΩx,i denote the execution tree of x until round i in execution Ω.
4 [FLM85] referred to these conditions as Locality Axiom. In the case of ABG, the secret key used by a player
is definitely a part of his view. Hence, we added condition (ii).
5We remark that θγx can differ from θ
δ
y . However, as long as long as they generate the same message for any player
z i.e. ∀x, y, z msgγi (x, z)x = msg
θ
i (y, z)y, it suffices for our proof.
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Figure 6: TαA and T
E1:α1
A at the end of k rounds.
We note the following – to show that a player, say x, receives same messages in two different
executions, say γ and δ, it suffices to show that execution trees T γx and T δx are similar. To prove
this similarity, we will use induction on the heights of T γx and T δx .
As a prelude to proving Lemma 3, we present adversary’s strategy in E1 : α1. Recall that we
defined scenario α1 as: In E1 A is the General and starts with input value 0. A¯ Byzantine corrupts
C in E1. In E2 A¯ Byzantine corrupts A.
Adversary’s (A¯) strategy in E1 : α1 is as follows:
1. Send outgoing messages of round i: Based on the messages received during round i − 1, A¯
decides on the messages to be sent in round i. For round 1, A¯ sends to B what an honest
C would have sent to B in execution E1 : α2. For i ≥ 2, A¯ authenticates msg
E1:α1
i−1 (B,C)B
using C’s key and sends it to A. For msgE1:α1i−1 (A,C)A, A¯ examines the message. If the
message has not been authenticated by B even once, it implies that the message has not
yet been seen by B. Then, A¯ sends a message to B which is same as what C would have
sent to B in round i of execution E1 : α2. Formally, A¯ constructs msg
E1:α1
i−1 (A,C)A such
that msgE1:α1i−1 (A,C)A = msg
E1:α2
i−1 (A,C)A. Note that this is possible because A is actively
corrupt in E2 : α1 and therefore A¯ can forge messages on behalf of A in E1 : α1. A¯ then
authenticates msgE1:α1i−1 (A,C)A using C’s key and sends it to B. However, if the message has
been authenticated by B even once, then A¯ simply authenticates msgE1:α1i−1 (A,C)A using C’s
key and sends it to B.
2. Receive incoming messages of round i: A¯ obtains messagesmsgE1:α1i (A,C)A andmsg
E1:α1
i (B,C)B
via C. (These messages are sent by A and B respectively to C in round i). Similarly via A, A¯
obtains messages msgE1:α1i (B,A)B and msg
E1:α1
i (C,A)C . (These are also round i messages
sent by B and C respectively to A. Players respectively compute these messages according
to their respective view until round i− 1).
Lemma 3 A¯ can ensure V αA ∼ V
E1:α1
A and V
α
B ∼ V
E1:α1
B .
Proof : Using induction on i, we show that for any round i, TαA,i ∼ T
E1:α1
A,i . It then follows that
TαA ∼ T
E1:α1
A . Combining this with Equation 5 gives V
α
A ∼ V
E1:α1
A .
Note that owing to the topology of L, only nodes present in TαA are A, B, C and A
′. B′ and
C ′ do not occur in TαA . Hence, A
′ has an outgoing directed edge only and only to C. Likewise, A
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has an outgoing directed edge only to B. Corresponding nodes present in TE1:α1A are A, B, C and
A respectively. We analyse TαA and T
E1:α1
A in a bottom up manner.
Base Case:
i = 1
Consider round 1 of executions α and E1 : α1. Corresponding execution trees T
α
A,1 and T
E1:α1
A,1
are shown in Figure 7. Now, B starts with same input, secret key and executes same code in α
and E1 : α1 i.e I
α
B = I
E1:α1
B , SK
α
B = SK
E1:α1
B and θ
α
B = θ
E1:α1
B (the last equality follows from our
definition of Π′ [Definition 5] ). Thus, B will send same messages to A in round 1 of α and E1 : α1
i.e. msgα1 (B,A)B = msg
E1:α1
1 (B,A)B . Since C is Byzantine corrupt in E1 : α1, A¯ can ensure that
msgα1 (C,A)C = msg
E1:α1
1 (C,A)C . Thus, T
α
A,1 ∼ T
E1:α1
A,1 .
A
B
A
BC C
Figure 7: TαA,1 and T
E1:α1
A,1 .
i = 2
We show that the similarity holds for round 2 as well. Consider TαA,2 and T
E1:α1
A,2 as shown in
Figure 8. Now, IαA = I
E1:α1
A , SK
α
A = SK
E1:α1
A , θ
α
A = θ
E1:α1
A and I
α
B = I
E1:α1
B , SK
α
B = SK
E1:α1
B ,
θαB = θ
E1:α1
B . Thus, msg
α
1 (A,B)A = msg
E1:α1
1 (A,B)A and msg
α
1 (B,C)B = msg
E1:α1
1 (B,C)B. Since
C is Byzantine corrupt in E1 : α1, A¯ can ensure that msg
α
1 (C,B)C = msg
E1:α1
1 (C,B)C .
B C
A C B
A
A′
B C
A C B
A
A
Figure 8: TαA,2 and T
E1:α1
A,2 .
Now, IαA′ 6= I
E1:α1
A , thus msg
α
1 (A
′, C)A′ 6= msg
E1:α1
1 (A,C)A. However, since A is Byzantine
corrupt in E2 : α1, A¯ can forge messages on behalf of A in E1 : α1 (follows from observations made
in Section 2.1). A¯ can use this to simulate C having received same messages in round 1 in E1 : α1
and α.
Specifically, as C is Byzantine faulty in E1 : α1, A¯ can construct msg
E1:α1
1 (A,C)A in a way
such that msgE1:α11 (A,C)A = msg
α
1 (A
′, C)A′ . Now B receives same round 1 messages in E1 : α1
and α and B has same input value, secret key and executes same code, thus msgE1:α12 (B,A)B =
msgα2 (B,A)B . Thus, edge BA (between levels 2 and 3) in T
E1:α1
A,2 is same as the corresponding edge
BA in TαA,2. Since, C is Byzantine corrupt A¯ can ensure that msg
E1:α1
2 (C,A)C = msg
α
2 (C,A)C .
Therefore, A¯ can ensure that the edge CA (between levels 2 and 3) in TE1:α1A,2 is same as the corre-
sponding edge CA in TαA,2. Thus, T
E1:α1
A,2 ∼ T
α
A,2.
Induction hypothesis: Let it be true for all rounds upto k i.e. ∀i, i ≤ k, TαA,i ∼ T
E1:α1
A,i . Likewise
∀i, i ≤ k, TαB,i ∼ T
E1:α1
B,i
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Induction step: We now prove that the similarity holds for round k + 1 as well i.e. TαA,k+1 ∼
TE1:α1A,k+1.
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Figure 9: TαA,k+1 and T
E1:α1
A,k+1.
Consider TαA,k+1 and T
E1:α1
A,k+1 as shown in Figure 9. Consider the edges between level k and
k + 1. From the induction hypothesis, we have ∀j ≤ k, TαA,j ∼ T
E1:α1
A,j . Further, I
α
A = I
E1:α1
A ,
SKαA = SK
E1:α1
A , θ
α
A = θ
E1:α1
A . Thus, A sends same messages to B in round k of both the executions
i.e. msgE1:α1k (A,B)A = msg
α
k (A,B)A. Thus, edge AB (between levels k and k+1) is same in both
the trees. Likewise, from the induction hypothesis we have ∀j ≤ k, TαB,j ∼ T
E1:α1
B,j . Therefore,
msgE1:α1k (B,C)B = msg
α
k (B,C)B . Hence, edge BC (between levels k and k + 1) is same in both
the trees.
Now, consider the nodes - A′ at level k in TαA and the corresponding node A in T
E1:α1
A . For
time being assume6 that ∀j ≤ k, TαA′,j ∼ T
E1:α1
A,j . We claim that A¯ can simulate C at level k + 1 in
TE1:α1A to have received messages from A
′ exactly same as the messages received by C at level k+1
in TαA . This is because A is Byzantine corrupt in E2 : α1, thus A¯ can forge messages on behalf of A
in E1 : α1. Formally, A¯ constructs msg
E1:α1
k (A
′, C)A′ such that msg
E1:α1
k (A
′, C)A′ = msg
α
k (A,C)A.
Thus, A¯ can ensure that the edge A′C (one between levels k and k + 1) in TE1:α1A,k+1 is same as the
corresponding edge AC in TE1:α1A,k+1.
Now, IαC = I
E1:α1
C , SK
α
C = SK
E1:α1
C , θ
α
C = θ
E1:α1
C Thus, C sends same round k + 1 messages to
A in α and E1 : α1 i.e. msg
E1:α1
k+1 (C,A)C = msg
α
k+1(C,A)C . Thus, edge CA (one between levels
k+1 and k+2) in TE1:α1A,k+1 is same as the corresponding edge AC in T
E1:α1
A,k+1. Similarly one can argue
that the edge BA (one between levels k+1 and k+2) in TE1:α1A,k+1 is same as the corresponding edge
BA in TαA,k+1. Thus, A¯ can ensure that T
α
A,k+1 ∼ T
E1:α1
A,k+1. Since it is true for all values of k, we
have TαA ∼ T
E1:α1
A .
The proof for V αB ∼ V
E1:α1
B follows on very similar lines, we omit the details.
Lemma 4 In execution α, players A and B output 0.
Proof : From Lemma 3, it follows that player A cannot distinguish execution E1 of scenario α1
from execution α (dubbed as E1 : α1
A
∼ α). Similarly, to player B execution E1 of scenario α1 is
indistinguishable from α (E1 : α1
B
∼ α). In E1 : α1, as per the definition of ABG [Definition 2] both
6 Using induction on the value of j, one can show that the assumption is true.
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A and B will decide on 0. Since, E1 : α1
A
∼ α and E1 : α1
B
∼ α, in α too A and B will decide on 0.
(We are able to make claims about the output of A and B in α as they cannot distinguish E1 : α1
from α. Thus, by analysing their output in E1 : α1, we can determine their output in α.)
Adversary’s strategy in E1 : α2 –
(Recall that adversary Byzantine corrupts A only in E1 : α2)
1. Send outgoing messages of round i: Based on the messages received during round i − 1, A¯
decides on the messages to be sent in round i. For round i, i ≥ 1, A¯ sends to B what an
honest A would have sent to B in execution E1 : α1. Formally, A¯ constructs msg
E1:α2
i (A,B)A
such that msgE1:α2i (A,B)A = msg
E1:α1
i (A,B)A. Likewise, A¯ sends to C what an honest A
would have sent to C in execution E1 : α3. Formally, A¯ constructs msg
E1:α2
i (A,C)A such that
msgE1:α2i (A,C)A = msg
E1:α3
i (A,C)A. Since A is Byzantine faulty in E1 : α2, A¯ can always
send the above stated messages.
2. Receive incoming messages of round i: A¯ obtains messagesmsgE1:α2i (B,A)B andmsg
E1:α2
i (C,A)C
via A.
Lemma 5 A¯ can ensure V αB ∼ V
E1:α2
B and V
α
C ∼ V
E1:α2
C .
Proof : Using induction on i, we show that for any i, TαB,i ∼ T
E1:α2
B,i . This implies T
α
B ∼ T
E1:α2
B .
From Equation 5 it then then follows that V αB ∼ V
E1:α2
B .
Base Case:
i = 1
Consider TαB,1 and T
E1:α2
B,1 are shown in Figure 10. C does not have any input in either α or E1 : α2.
Thus, IαC = I
E1:α2
C holds trivially. Further, C starts with same secret key and executes same code
in α and E1 : α2 i.e SK
α
C = SK
E1:α2
C and θ
α
C = θ
E1:α2
C . Thus, it will send same messages to B in
round 1 of α and E1 : α2 i.e. msg
E1:α2
1 (C,B)C = msg
α
1 (C,B)C . Since A is Byzantine corrupt in
E1 : α2, A¯ can ensure that msg
E1:α2
1 (A,B)A = msg
α
1 (A,B)A. Thus, T
α
B,1 ∼ T
E1:α2
B,1 .
B B
A C A C
Figure 10: TαB,1 and T
E1:α2
B,1 .
i = 2
We now argue that the similarity holds for round 2 as well. Consider TαB,2 and T
E1:α2
B,2 as shown
Figure 11. Now, B does not have any input in either α or E1 : α2, thus I
α
B = I
E1:α2
B is trivially
true. Further, SKαB = SK
E1:α2
B and θ
α
B = θ
E1:α2
B . Hence, msg
E1:α2
1 (B,A)B = msg
α
1 (B,A)B and
msgE1:α21 (B,C)B = msg
α
1 (B,C)B. Likewise, C does not have any input in α and E1 : α2, hence,
IαC = I
E1:α2
C . Also, SK
α
C = SK
E1:α2
C and θ
α
C = θ
E1:α2
C . Hence, msg
E1:α2
1 (C,A)C = msg
α
1 (C,A)C .
Since, A is Byzantine corrupt in E1 : α2, A¯ can ensure that msg
α
1 (A
′, C)A′ = msg
E1:α2
1 (A,C)A.
On similar lines, one can get msgE1:α22 (C,B)C = msg
α
2 (C,B)C . Since, A is Byzantine corrupt
in E1 : α2, A¯ can ensure that msg
E1:α2
2
(A,B)A = msg
α
2 (A,B)A. Thus, T
α
B,2 ∼ T
E1:α2
B,2 .
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Figure 11: TαB,2 and T
E1:α1
A,2 .
Induction hypothesis: Let it be true for all rounds upto k i.e. ∀i, i ≤ k, TαB,i ∼ T
E1:α2
B,i . Likewise
∀i, i ≤ k, TαC,i ∼ T
E1:α2
C,i
Induction step: We now show that the similarity holds for round k+1 too i.e. TαB,k+1 ∼ T
E1:α2
B,k+1.
C
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Level k
Level k − 1
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Level k − 1
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Figure 12: TαB,k+1 and T
E1:α2
B,k+1.
Consider TαB,k+1 and T
E1:α2
B,k+1 as shown in Figure 12. Consider the edges between level k and
k + 1. From the induction hypothesis, we have ∀j ≤ k, TαB,j ∼ T
E1:α2
B,j . Now, I
α
B = I
E1:α2
B ,
SKαB = SK
E1:α2
B , θ
α
B = θ
E1:α2
B . Thus, B sends same messages to A in round k of both the executions
i.e. msgE1:α2k (B,A)B = msg
α
k (B,A)B . Thus, edge BA (between levels k and k + 1) is same in
both the trees. Likewise, B sends same messages to C in round k of both the executions i.e.
msgE1:α2k (B,C)B = msg
α
k (B,C)B . Thus, edge BC (between levels k and k + 1) is same in both
the trees.
From the induction hypothesis we have ∀j ≤ k, TαC,j ∼ T
E1:α2
C,j . Since, I
α
C = I
E1:α2
C , SK
α
C =
SKE1:α2C and θ
α
C = θ
E1:α2
C , therefore, C sends same messages to A in round k of both the executions
i.e. msgE1:α2k (C,A)C = msg
α
k (C,A)C . Hence, edge CA (between levels k and k + 1) is same in
both the trees.
Using same arguments as in preceding two paragraphs, we get C sends same messages to B
in round k + 1 of both the executions i.e. msgE1:α2k+1 (C,B)C = msg
α
k+1(C,B)C . Hence, edge CB
(between levels k + 1 and k + 2) is same in both the trees. Now, given A is Byzantine faulty in
E1 : α2, A¯ sends that msg
E1:α2
k+1 (A,B)A which ensures msg
E1:α2
k+1 (A,B)A = msg
α
k+1(A,B)A. Thus,
the edge AB (between levels k and k + 1) is same in both the trees.
The proof for V αC ∼ V
E1:α2
C is nearly a repetition of the above arguments. Details omitted.
Lemma 6 In execution α, output of B will be same output of C.
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Proof : From Lemma 5, we get that player B cannot distinguish execution E1 : α2 from α (dubbed
as E1 : α2
B
∼ α). Similarly, to player C execution E1 : α2 is indistinguishable from α (E1 : α2
B
∼ α).
Since, the General (A) is Byzantine corrupt in E1 : α2, from the definition of ABG [Definition 2],
in E1 : α2, B and C must have the same output. Then, so must B and C in α.
Adversary’s strategy in E1 : α3 –
(Recall that in α3 A¯ Byzantine corrupts B in E1 and A in E2.)
1. Send outgoing messages of round i: Based on the messages received during round i − 1, A¯
decides on the messages to be sent in round i. For round 1, A¯ sends to C what an honest B
would have sent to C in execution E1 : α2. For i ≥ 2, A¯ authenticates msg
E1:α3
i−1 (C,B)C using
B’s key and sends it to A. For msgE1:α3i−1 (A,B)A, A¯ examines the message. If the message
has not been authenticated by C even once, it implies that the message has not yet been
seen by C. Then, A¯ authenticates and sends a message to C which is same as what B would
have sent to C in round i of execution E1 : α2. Formally, A¯ constructs msg
E1:α3
i−1 (A,B)A such
that msgE1:α3i−1 (A,B)A ∼ msg
E1:α2
i−1 (A,B)A. A¯ then authenticates msg
E1:α1
i−1 (A,B)A using B’s
key and sends it to C. If the message has been authenticated by B even once, A¯ simply
authenticates msgE1:α1i−1 (A,B)A using B’s key and sends it to C.
2. Receive incoming messages of round i: A¯ obtains messagesmsgE1:α3i (A,B)A andmsg
E1:α3
i (C,B)C
via B. Likewise, via A, A¯ obtains messages msgE1:α3i (B,A)B and msg
E1:α3
i (C,A)C .
Lemma 7 A¯ can ensure V αC ∼ V
E1:α3
C and V
α
A′ ∼ V
E1:α3
A .
Proof : Owing to the symmetry of L, the proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 3. Details
omitted.
Lemma 8 In execution α, players C and A′ output 1.
Proof : From Lemma 7, we have E1 : α3
C
∼ α and E1 : α3
A′
∼ α. From Definition 2, A and C will
output 1 in E1 : α3. Then, so must A
′ and C in α.
4.2 Finale
We now proceed to proving the main result of this work.
Theorem 9 (Main Theorem) ABG over n players, tolerating a t-adversary, can be self-composed
in parallel for any number of executions if and only if n ≥ 2t.
Proof : By combining Lemma 10 and Lemma 11.
Lemma 10 If n < 2t, then there does not exist any ABG protocol that self-composes in parallel
even twice (∆2) over a network of n players, tolerating a t-adversary.
Proof : Our proof demonstrates that if n ≤ 2t1 +min(t1, t2), t2 > 0, then there does not exist any
∆2, over a network (N
′) of n players tolerating a (t1,t2)-adversary. Here, t1 and t2 are the number
of players that the adversary can corrupt in the two parallel executions E1 and E2, respectively,
of ∆2 such that t1+t2 ≤ t (dubbed as (t1,t2)-adversary). Substituting t1 = t − 1 and t2 = 1 in
n ≤ 2t1 +min(t1, t2), gives the impossibility of ∆2 when n < 2t. Hence, the Lemma.
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To show the impossibility of ∆2 when n ≤ 2t1 + min(t1, t2), t2 > 0, we assume otherwise
and arrive at a contradiction. For the purpose of contradiction, we assume the existence of ∆2
over N ′ such that n ≤ 2t1 + min(t1, t2), t2 > 0, tolerating a (t1,t2)-adversary. Using ∆2, we
construct a protocol Π2 over a network N of 3 nodes, P={A,B,C}, that tolerates an adversary
basis A¯ = {((C), (A)); ((A), (∅)); ((B), (A))}. But this contradicts Theorem 2, hence the assumed
protocol ∆2 cannot exist.
Construction of Π2 from ∆2 is as follows: partition the n players in N
′ into three, mutually
disjoint, non-empty sets IA, IB and IC such that |IA| ≤ min(t1, t2), |IB | ≤ t1 and |IC | ≤ t1.
Since n ≤ 2t1 +min(t1, t2), such a partitioning is always possible. The edges in N
′ can then be
considered as bundle of edges between the sets IA, IB and IC . Let E1, E2 be two parallel executions
of ∆2. Since ∆2 tolerates (t1, t2)-adversary, then ∆2 will tolerate an adversary, A, characterised by
adversary basis {((IC), (IA)); ((IA), (∅)); ((IB ), (IA))}. Let the corresponding parallel executions of
Π2 be E
′
1 and E
′
2. Player i, i ∈ {A,B,C}, in execution E
′
l, l ∈ {1, 2}, simulates all the players in
set Ii in execution El. W.l.o.g, let the honest, passively corrupt and Byzantine faulty players in E
′
l
simulate the honest, passively corrupt and Byzantine faulty players respectively in El.
Player i in E′l simulates players in Ii in El as follows: player i keeps a track of the states of
all the players in Ii. It assigns its input value to every member of Ii and emulates the steps of all
the players in Ii as well as the messages communicated between every pair of players in Ii. If any
player in Ii sends a message to any player in Ij , j ∈ {A,B,C}, i 6= j, then player i sends exactly
the same message to player j. If any player in Ii terminates then so does player i. If any player in
Ii decides on a value v, then so does player i.
We, now, show that if ∆2 satisfies Definition 2 tolerating A, then so does Π2 tolerating
A¯ = {((C), (A)); ((A), (∅)); ((B), (A))}. Let i and j, (i 6= j), be two non-faulty players (honest
or passively corrupt but not Byzantine faulty) in execution E′l of Π2. Player i (likewise j) simulates
at least one player in Ii (Ij) in execution El. Since both i, j are non-faulty in E
′
l, then so are all
the players in Ii, Ij in El. If the General is non-faulty in E
′
l and starts with a value v, then in
El too, the General is non-faulty and starts with a value v. Hence, as per the definition of ABG
[Definition 2], all the players in Ii, Ij in execution El must decide on value v. Then, so should
players i, j in E′l . If the General is faulty in E
′
l , then so is the General in El. As per the definition
of ABG all the players in Ii, Ij in execution El must have the same output. Then, so should players
i, j in E′l. This implies Π2 satisfies Definition 2 tolerating A¯, contradicting Theorem 2.
We now show that the bound of n < 2t is tight. For this we present a protocol – EIGPrune+
(Figure 13) and prove that if n ≥ 2t, then EIGPrune+ remains a valid ABG protocol under any
number parallel self-compositions (Lemma 11). EIGPrune+ is based on a sequence of transforma-
tions on EIG tree [BNDDS87]. [Lyn96, page 108] gives an excellent discussion on the construction
of EIG tree. EIGPrune+ is essentially same as EIGPrune protocol [GGBS10]7, barring two mi-
nor additions – (i) Each concurrent execution of the protocol is augmented with a Unique Session
Identifier(USID). (ii) Non-faulty players in any concurrent execution reject any message that does
not carry a valid USID. We remark that like EIGPrune, EIGPrune+ is also exponential in the
number of messages. However, owing to the simplicity and intuitive appeal of the protocol we
present the same as it makes the discussion very lucid. The exponential nature of the protocol is
not a serious concern as using well known techniques in literature [BNDDS87], it can be converted
into an efficient protocol.
Definition 6 (Prune(EIG)) It takes an EIG tree as an input and deletes subtrees say sj
i (subtree
7For the benefit of the reader we reproduce EIGPrune, as proposed by Gupta et al., in Appendix A.
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In every concurrent execution:
1. The General G send his value to every player.
2. On receiving this value from G, every player assumes it be his input value and exchanges messages
with others as per EIGStop protocol [Lyn96, page 103] for t+ 1 rounds.
3. At the end of t+ 1 rounds of EIGStop protocol, player pi discards any messages that does not have a
valid authentication or USID and invokes Prune(EIG) [Definition 6].
4. Player pi applies the following decision rule – take majority of the values at the first level (i.e. all the
nodes with labels l such that l ∈ P) of its EIG tree. If a majority exists, player pi decides on that
value; else, pi decides on default value, v0.
Figure 13: EIGPrune+ Protocol
rooted at a node whose’s label is j in EIG tree of player i) as given in the sequel. For each subtree
sj
i, where label j ∈ P, a set Wj is constructed that contains all distinct values that ever appears in
sj
i. If |Wj | > 1, sj
i is deleted and modified EIG tree is returned.
Our proof of correctness of EIGPrune+ is based on the idea developed by Lindell et al. [LLR02],
wherein, the security of a protocol in the concurrent setting is reduced to the security of the protocol
in the stand alone setting. In our case, to ensure that this reduction is correct, we must account
for the possibility of the players being (implicitly) passively corrupt in an execution (from the
observation made in section 2.2). For this reason, we use a variant of ABG - christened as ABGmix,
proposed by Gupta et al. [GGBS10], as the stand alone setting for our reduction.
Gupta et al. studied (stand alone) ABG in the presence of a mixed adversary that can corrupt up
to any tb players actively and up to another tp players passively (dubbed as (tb,tp)-adversary). The
adversary, thus, can forge the signatures of all tb+ tp players. Further, Gupta et al. require all the
passively corrupt players to always output a value same as the output of the honest players. They
prove that (stand alone) ABGmix over a completely connected synchronous network of n players
tolerating a (tb,tp)-adversary, tp > 0, is solvable if and only if n > 2tb + min(tb, tp). It is easy
to see that like EIGPrune, EIGPrune+ is also a correct protocol for ABGmix. By substituting
tb = t− 1 and tp = 1, their result can be extended to achieve a bound of n ≥ 2t.
Lemma 11 EIGPrune+ over n players, tolerating a t-adversary, is a valid ABG protocol that
self-composes for any number of parallel executions if n ≥ 2t.
Proof : Let Ψ(id1),Ψ(id2), . . . ,Ψ(idl)
8 be l parallel executions of EIGPrune+. For the purpose
of contradiction assume that there exists an adversary, A, that attacks these l parallel executions
and succeeds in execution Ψ(idi), for some i ∈ (1, l). Using A we construct an adversary A
′ that
is bound to succeed in the (stand alone) execution, ϕ, of EIGPrune for ABGmix. This contradicts
the results of Gupta et al., hence the Lemma.
Our construction ofA′ requiresA′ to internally simulate the parallel executions Ψ(id1),Ψ(id2), . . . ,
Ψ(idl). For this to happen, A
′ must be able to simulate the signatures generated by the honest
players in these executions. To facilitate the same we assume A′ is given access to all the oracles9
S¬id(sk1, ·), . . . , S¬id(skn, ·). Further, to ensure that the above simulation is perfect we augment
8Ψ(idi) denotes the use of USID in the i
th concurrent execution of Ψ.
9Players use the signature scheme, ((Gen,Sid,Vid),S¬id), developed by Lindell et al. [LLR02]. We present a brief
overview of the same in Appendix B.
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the stand alone execution, ϕ, of EIGPrune for ABGmix with USID – ϕ(id). It is easy to see that
this augmentation has no bearing on the correctness of EIGPrune. Formally, for ABGmix, if ϕ is
a correct execution of EIGPrune, then so is ϕ(id).
Construction of A′ is as follows: A′ internally incorporates A¯ and attacks ϕ(id) as given in
the sequel. A′ selects an execution i, i ∈ (1, l), and sets id=idi. Then, A
′ invokes A¯ and sim-
ulates the concurrent executions of Ψ(id1) . . .Ψ(idl) for A¯. A
′ does this by playing the roles of
the non-faulty players in all the executions but Ψ(id). Since A′ has access to the signing oracles
S¬id(sk1, ·), . . . , S¬id(skn, ·), it can generate signature on behalf of honest players in all the exe-
cutions Ψ(idj), j 6= i. In Ψ(id), A
′ externally interacts with the non-faulty players and passes
messages between them and A¯. A′ interacts with the players in Ψ(idi) in exactly the same manner
as A¯ interacts with players in Ψ(idi). Note that this is possible because if A¯ forges messages on
behalf of some player in Ψ(idi) by active corrupting this player in Ψ(idj), j 6= i; then A
′ can do
the same by passively corrupting this particular player in Ψ(id). Since, A′ never queries the oracle
for messages whose prefix is id. Therefore, the emulation by A′of the concurrent executions for A¯
is perfect. Thus, if A¯ succeeds in breaking Ψ(id), then A′ will break ϕ(id).
5 Closing Remarks
In this paper we argue for the need of a better model for studying self composition of ABG protocols.
We propose a new model to study composition of ABG protocols and show that, in this model,
unique session identifiers aid in improving the fault-tolerance of ABG protocols (that compose in
parallel) but from n > 3t only to n ≥ 2t. Note that, in the stand alone setting, ABG is possible for
n > t. Thus surprisingly, USID’s may not always achieve their goal of truly separating the protocol’s
execution from its environment to the fullest extent. However, for most functionalities, USID’s
indeed achieve their objective, as is obvious from Universal Composability (UC) theorem [Can01].
Besides proving (im-)possibility results for self composition of ABG, our work also brings to
forefront a few minor, yet interesting and undesirable properties of UC framework. It will nice to
see if one can fine tune UC framework to this end. Further, with respect to composition of ABG
protocols, we show that the worst-case adversary (with respect to a given execution) is not the
one that corrupts players at full-throttle across all protocols running concurrently in the network.
There may be several other problems apart from ABG wherein similar anomaly holds. It is an
intriguing open question to characterize the set of all such problems. Further, from our results of
n ≥ 2t, it appears that studying self composition of ABG protocols over general networks will be
interesting in its own right.
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A EIGPrune Protocol [GGBS10]
For the benefit of the reader, we now reproduce the protocol proposed by Gupta et al. (Figure 14).
It is obtained by a sequence of transformations on EIG tree [BNDDS87]. [Lyn96, page 108] gives
an excellent discussion on the construction of EIG tree. All the messages exchanged during the
protocol are signed/authenticated. We only give the protocol here. The proof of its correctness in
stand alone setting for the problem of ABGmix can be found in [GGBS10]
EIGPrune Algorithm
General G send his value to every player. Every player assumes this value from the G as his input
value and exchanges messages with others as per EIGStop protocol [Lyn96, page 103] for tb+ tp+1
rounds.
At the end of tb+ tp+1 rounds of EIGStop protocol, player pi invokes Prune(EIG) [Definition 7].
Player pi applies the following decision rule – take majority of the values at the first level (i.e. all
the nodes with labels l such that l ∈ P) of its EIG tree. If a majority exists, player pi decides on
that value; else, pi decides on default value, v0.
Figure 14: EIGPrune algorithm
Definition 7 (Prune(EIG)) This method that takes an EIG tree as an input and deletes subtrees
say subtreej
i (subtreej
i refers to a subtree in i’s EIG tree such that the subtree is rooted at node
whose’s label is j) of i′s EIG tree as given in the sequel. For each subtree subtreej
i, where label
j ∈ P, a set Wj is constructed which contains all distinct values that ever appears in subtreej
i. If
|Wj | > 1, subtreej
i is deleted and modified EIG tree is returned.
B Lindell et al.’s Signature Scheme
We present an overview of the signature scheme ((Gen,Sid,Vid),S¬id) developed by Lindell et
al. [LLR02]. They define a signature scheme as (Gen,S,V ) where S,V are are algorithms for
signing and verification of any message. Gen is used to generate signature and verification keys
for a particular player (say Pk) and defined as a function: (1)
n → (vk, sk). A signature scheme
is said to be a valid one if honestly generated signatures are almost always accepted. Formally,
with non negligible probability, for every message m, V(vk,m,S(sk,m)) = 1, where (vk, sk) ←
(1)n. They model the valid signatures that adversary A¯ can obtain in a real attack via a signing
oracle S(sk, ·). A¯ is defined to succeed in generating a forged message m∗ if A¯ given vk, access to
oracle S(sk, ·) can generate a pair (m∗, σ∗) such that if Qm is the set of oracle queries made by
A¯ then V(vk,m∗,σ∗) = 1 holds true if m∗ 6∈ Qm. A signature scheme is said to be existentially
secure against chosen-message attack if A¯ cannot succeed in forging a signature with greater than
non-negligible probability. They further model any information gained by A¯ from any query with
another oracle Aux(sk,.). However, this oracle cannot generate any valid signature but provides
any other auxiliary information about the query. They assume some scheme say (Gen,S,V ) to be
secure against chosen-message attack and show how to construct a secure scheme (Gen,Sid,Vid)
from it where Sid(sk,m) = S(sk,id ◦m) and Vid(vk,m,σ) = V (vk,id ◦m,σ). For the new scheme
they define the oracle Aux(sk,·) = S¬id(sk,m) where S¬id(sk,m) = S(sk,m) if the prefix of m is not
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id else S¬id(sk,m) = ⊥. Further, they assume pi to be a secure protocol for ABG using signature
scheme (Gen,S,V ). They define modified protocol pi(id) to be exactly same as pi except that it
uses signature scheme (Gen,Sid,Vid) as defined above. They further prove as to why ((Gen,Sid,Vid),
S¬id) is secure against chosen-message attack. Intuition behind the proof is the fact that if the
prefix of m 6= id, then S¬id(sk,m) = S(sk,m) which is of no help to the adversary as any successful
forgery must be prefixed with id and all oracle queries to S¬id must be prefixed with id
′ 6= id.
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